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Privatization of public assets has been a widely-adopted policy in recent years. In addition
to the widespread privatization accompanying the downfall of Communism, there have been
numerous privatizations in both developed and less developed countries. Privatization has
been advocated on a number of grounds, including improvements in operating eﬃciency and
the desire to subject managers to the discipline of takeover markets.
An important element of the case for privatization is the claim that the sale of publicly-
owned assets permits an improvement in the ﬁnancial position of governments, and, in par-
ticular, a reduction in public debt. This argument has been prominent in the advocacy of
privatization by the World Bank, summarized by Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992). This
motivation is particularly important in the case of partial privatization, where governments
retain majority ownership, so that there is no reason to anticipate changes in operating
eﬃciency or beneﬁcial eﬀects of capital market discipline.
Despite the frequency with which privatization is recommended as a ﬁscal expedient, it
is frequently the case, particularly in developed countries, that the sale proceeds realized
through privatization are less than the expected earnings of the enterprise under continued
public ownership, discounted at the real bond rate (Vickers and Yarrow 1988, Quiggin 1995).
In some cases, particularly where privatization is undertaken through an initial public oﬀering
of stock, the diﬀerence is partly due to the fact that the oﬀer price is well below the market
price revealed on the ﬁrst day of trading. The case of British Telecom, examined by Vickers
and Yarrow, is illustrative.
A more fundamental reason for the divergence between sale prices and future earnings
is the substantial diﬀerence, referred to as the equity premium, between the rate of return
d e m a n d e db yh o l d e r so fe q u i t ya n dt h er a t eo fr e t u r nd e m a n d e db yt h eh o l d e r so fg o v e r n m e n t
bonds. As was ﬁrst observed by Mehra and Prescott (1985), the magnitude of the equity
premium is a puzzle, since application of the standard consumption capital asset pricing
model (CCAPM) with plausible parameters suggests that the premium should be less than
one percentage point. By contrast, typical empirical estimates of the equity premium are
around six percentage points.
Kocherlakota (1996) surveys a large number of papers in which attempts are made to
explain the large observed values of the equity premium and concludes that ‘it’s still a puzzle’.
Although the explanations surveyed by Kocherlakota diﬀer in many respects, all of them are
based on the assumption that holdings of equity can be regarded simply as claims to a
particular proportion of corporate proﬁt s ,w i t hn oa c c o u n tb e i n gt a k e no ft h ep r o p e r t i e so f
the stock markets in which equities are bought and sold. In the terminology of Hirshleifer
and Riley (1992) these models only deal with event uncertainty and do not consider issues of
market uncertainty such as the optimal search for trading partners or disequilibrium processes
and price dynamics. Implicitly, some version of the eﬃcient markets hypothesis is assumed
1to apply to stock markets, although failures in other ﬁnancial markets (such as insurance
markets) are postulated in some cases.
The work of Shiller (1989) suggests an alternative approach to the equity premium puzzle.
If, as Shiller argues, ﬁnancial markets display excess volatility, then returns to holdings of
equity are riskier than are the associated streams of corporate proﬁts. Shiller’s insight has
been formalized in the ‘noise trader’ model of De Long et al. (1990). In this model, risk over
and above that due to the dividend-generating process is introduced into the economy by the
distorted and stochastic, beliefs of misinformed investors referred to as ‘noise traders’. De
Long et al. observe that this excess risk implies an increase in the equity premium relative
to the case when all investors have rational expectations, but they do not consider the policy
implications of this observation. De Long et al. show that, although both noise traders
and sophisticated investors are made better oﬀ in ex ante terms (given their beliefs) by the
availability of trade, this apparent welfare improvement arises at the expense of those holding
equity when trade is introduced, such as entrepreneurs making initial public oﬀerings.
A large number of subsequent writers have developed the work of Shiller (1989) and
De Long et al. (1990) on market volatility. Although the use of terms like ‘excess volatility’
implies some departure from eﬃciency and therefore some potential policy implications, these
issues have received relatively little attention.1 In particular, the implications of volatility
generated by noise traders for the appropriate risk premium for public investments, and for
the welfare and distributional eﬀects of privatization, have not been considered.
In this paper, we address the latter issue. We modify the De Long et al. model to allow
for the existence of an asset that is initially publicly owned, but is otherwise similar to the
private asset considered by De Long et al. We then examine the consequences of privatization
for asset prices and demands, and for the welfare of diﬀerent groups. Since the notion of
welfare is ambiguous in the presence of systematically distorted beliefs, we consider both
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ notions of welfare. Finally, we consider the implications of the
model for the political economy of privatization.
2T h e A n a l y s i s
Following De Long et al. (1990) we introduce a stripped-down overlapping generations model
with two-period lived agents. There is a single consumption good but there is no consumption
when young, no labor supply decision and no bequest motive. The only decision an agent
m a k e si sh e rc h o i c eo fp o r t f o l i ow h e ny o u n gt oﬁnance her consumption when old.
There is no fundamental risk and all assets pay a ﬁxed real dividend r. One asset, the
safe asset, is in perfectly elastic supply. Any unit of the safe asset can be converted into
1 Orosel (1996) discusses potential adverse welfare implications arising from the availability of public
information in stock markets. Palley (1999) considers the implications of a ‘noise trader’ model for taxes on
international ﬁnancial transactions.
2one unit of the consumption good, and vice versa. As De Long et al. note, the safe asset is
formally equivalent to a storage technology that pays a real net return of r. Furthermore, if
we take the consumption good in each period as the numeraire, the price of the safe asset
is always one. A second asset, that we shall interpret as the pre-privatization economy-wide
portfolio of equity, is in ﬁxed supply, normalized to one. The price of this equity asset in
period t is denoted by pe
t. De Long et al. point out that if the price of the equity asset were
simply the net present value of its future dividends, then its price in every period would also
be 1. But, in the presence of noise traders, De Long et al. show that this is not the case.
Extending De Long et al., we introduce a third asset that is also in ﬁxed supply, x<1,
and that generates a real dividend r. Initially, this asset is owned by the government and
ﬁnanced entirely through short-term (one-period) government debt. Government debt, the
fourth asset in our model, pays a guaranteed ﬁxed real interest r. As government debt is a
perfect substitute for the safe asset, its price in every period is always one.
Every generation is the same size and can be divided into two classes: a proportion λ
who are noise traders (denoted N) whose behavior is described in more detail in subsequent
subsections below, and a proportion 1 − λ who are sophisticated investors (denoted I). In
each period, the representative sophisticated investor has rational expectations about the
distribution of returns from holding a portfolio with risky assets, and so maximizes her
expected utility given the distribution of her wealth implied by her portfolio choice.
2.1 The Pre-Privatization Equilibrium
For any period t in which the third asset remains in government ownership, the government
issues x units of new debt (of one-period maturation) which is purchased by individuals who
are young in period t. Using the proceeds of this bond sale together with the real dividend
generated by the government-owned asset, the government pays out the amount (1 + r)x to
the holders of the x units of government debt that was issued in period t − 1 and that has
m a t u r e di np e r i o dt.
In each period t, the representative noise trader who is young in that period misperceives








We assume that both sophisticated investors and noise traders are expected utility max-
imizers characterized by a constant coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion equal to γ.T h u s ,a n
agent who is young in period t, chooses her portfolio to maximize her certainty equivalent
consumption in period t +1 . That is, she maximizes w − γσ2
w/2, where w is the expected
ﬁn a lw e a l t hi np e r i o dt +1 ,a n dσ2
w is the variance of her period t +1wealth.
De Long et al. (1990) show that, in a stationary equilibrium, that is, where one imposes
the requirement that the unconditional distribution of pe
t+1 be identical to the distribution
3of pe
















2 is the constant one-period-ahead variance of pe
t.2
Since noise traders allocate more of their wealth to equity than do sophisticated investors,
and earn negative capital gains on average, they can earn higher expected returns than
sophisticated investors only if the dividend on equity amounts to a higher rate of return on
average than the same dividend on the safe asset (and the government bond). That is, equity
must sell at an average price below its fundamental value of one. As De Long et al. (1990, p.
731) observe “[i]t is important to stress that our model sheds light on the Mehra—Prescott
puzzle only if equities are underpriced ..”.
Hence we shall assume that equities are underpriced, that is, E[pe




2 − d∗ > 0.( 2 )
Provided the variance of the representative noise trader’s misperception of the expected price
of the asset tomorrow is suﬃciently large, this is consistent with the hypothesis that noise
traders are “bullish” on average, that is, d∗ > 0.
2.2 The Post-Privatization Equilibrium
We shall now consider the situation where the government announces at the beginning of
period 0 that it is privatizing the third asset which it has held in government ownership up
to that date. The amount (1 + r)x owing on the outstanding stock of government bonds
which are held by the current old generation, will be paid out of the dividend xr generated
b yt h ea s s e ta n dt h er e v e n u epne
0 x generated by the sell-oﬀ of the x units of supply of this
a s s e ta tt h ep r i c epne
0 . Any shortfall (respectively, windfall) will be met by a stream of higher
(respectively, lower) taxes in each subsequent period that has the same net present value as
the shortfall (respectively, windfall).
As a natural generalization of the De Long et al. model, we assume that the misper-
ceptions in period t (for t ≥ 0) of the expected price of equity and the expected price of
the privatized asset (the “new equity”) in period t +1are independently and identically






































2 See De Long et al. (1990) pp. 708—11 for the derivation.













































































Consider a sophisticated investor with an amount c0 to invest in period t. Her objective
is to choose a portfolio qT
I =( qe
I,qne
I ), where qe
I is her holding of equity and qne
I is her holding
of the privatized asset, and the remainder of her wealth (c0 − pT
t qI)i si n v e s t e di nt h es a f e
asset and/or government bonds. Her optimal portfolio choice maximizes:





I ΣtqI.( 3 )
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The only diﬀerence between (3) and (4) is the last term of (4) which reﬂects the noise
traders’ misperceptions of the expected returns from holding equity and from holding the
privatized asset.










t [r1 + µt − (1 + r)pt + dt].

















We conﬁne attention to steady-state equilibria by imposing the requirement that the uncon-
ditional distribution of pt+1 be identical to the distribution of pt. As was the case in the



























































2 (β + x). (8)
Notice that for small x, the correlation coeﬃcient β is approximately equal to the ‘beta’
coeﬃcient that would come out of the standard CAPM.
2.3 Welfare Eﬀects of the Privatization
The intertemporal production technology for the consumption good implicitly embodies a
real net return of r. Hence, welfare changes across generations in this economy can be char-
acterized in terms of the net present value of the changes in consumption streams using a
discount rate of r.
For t ≥ 0,l e t∆CEI
t (respectively, ∆CEN
t )d e n o t ef o rt h er e p r e s e n t a t i v es o p h i s t i c a t e d
investor (respectively, noise-trader) who is young in period t−1, the change that results from
the privatization in his or her certainty equivalent consumption in period t.N o t i c et h a tf o r
t ≥ 1, ∆CEN
t is calculated with respect to the misperceived estimate of the prices of old
equity and the privatized asset for period t that is made by the noise traders in the period in
which they are young (that is, period t−1). Let ∆B0 denote the change in the government’s
budget in period 0 that arises as a result of the privatization. If we let ∆W denote the sum
of ∆B0 and the net present value of the changes in the certainty equivalent consumption of















t .( 9 )
Let y denote the value the variable y would have taken if the government had not priva-
tized the asset in period 0. We consider the changes to each group in turn.
Government
E[∆B0]=E[pne
0 ]x + xr − x(1 + r)
= x(E[pne









2 (β + x)
!
. (10)
6Assuming that condition (2) is satisﬁed, so that there is a positive equity premium, the
government will be worse oﬀ whenever β +x is suﬃciently close to or greater than 1. Notice
that although this is more likely to hold the larger is the scale of the privatization relative to
the existing equity market (i.e. the larger is x), even a small scale privatization may worsen
the government’s ﬁnancial position, if the representative noise-trader’s misperceptions of the
expected price of equity and the expected price of the privatized asset are suﬃciently highly
correlated (that is, β is suﬃciently close to 1).
Consumers in period 0.
These consumers have already made their portfolio choice in the previous period. The
only action they undertake in period 0 is to sell their portfolio on the market to ﬁnance their
consumption. Inspection of (1) and (7) reveals that pe
0 and pe



















which means that consumers in period 0 will lose (respectively, gain) if the noise traders’
m i s p e r c e p t i o no ft h ee x p e c t e dp r i c eo ft h en e w l yp r i v a t i z e da s s e ti nt h en e x tp e r i o di sp o s i -
tively (respectively, negatively) correlated with their misperception of the expected price of
the old equity in the next period.
Consumers in period t ≥ 1.



















































































































































































Hence the per capita change in the ex ante certainty equivalent consumption for the

































































































2rλγ (1 + β)σ2
d
.(14)
Alternative measure — expected utility with respect to “true distribution”.
An alternative measure of the welfare eﬀects of the privatization is to evaluate the ex-
pected utility of every agent with respect to the true distribution of consumption. The only


















r1 + µt−1 − (1 + r)pt−1 + dt−1
¤
.
From (5) we have

























































2rλγ (1 + β)σ2
d
. (15)











rλγ (1 + β)σ2
d
.
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the extra consumption that noise traders’ misperceptions lead them to
expect, on average, to receive by holding the privatized asset while the second term reﬂects
the certainty-equivalent consumption cost of the risk associated with taking bets based on
misperceived expected future prices of the privatized asset.
3 The political economy of privatization
The analysis above yields a range of insights into the political economy of privatization. First,
consider the impact on government. From (10), privatization will, for plausible parameter
values, reduce the net worth of government. However, this reduction is obscured by the
standard system of government ﬁnancial statistics (GFS) in which the returns from asset
sales are treated as revenue (or sometimes negative expenditure) in the year in which sales
take place. Thus, from the viewpoint of ministers and oﬃcials relying on the GFS statistics,
privatization always yields an improvement in the government’s ﬁnancial position (provided
the sale price exceeds one year’s earnings, that is, pne
0 >rin our model). This was an
important element of the case for privatization in the United Kingdom (Zahariadis 1995)
and Australia (Quiggin 1995).
The eﬀect on the government may also be considered as the eﬀect on a taxpayer—voter
who satisﬁes Ricardian equivalence but does not participate in the equity market. In general,
non-shareholders have been hostile to privatization, suggesting that they may be closer to
Ricardian equivalence than experts using the Government Financial Statistics system.
The eﬀect on period-zero consumers may be taken as a proxy for the eﬀect on holders of
private equity at the time of privatization, and particularly on those who wish to sell equity,
for example, through initial public oﬀerings. Large-scale privatizations have frequently raised
concerns that the creation of large quantities of new equity will exceed the willingness of
markets to buy equity at existing prices (which will be the case in our model when β > 0).
This is one reason for the popularity of partial privatization (in our model, small values of
x).
9The most interesting welfare issues arise with respect to consumers in periods greater
than t ≥ 1. We may consider three possible policy frameworks, referred to as ‘paternalist’,
‘preference-maximizing’ and ‘libertarian.’ A ‘paternalist’ government would seek to maxi-
mize an ‘objective’ welfare measure based on the true probability distribution. Under the
assumptions of the model presented above, such a government would always retain full pub-
lic ownership. A ‘preference-maximizing’ government would undertake privatization if and
only if the expected aggregate beneﬁt( 1 5 )w a sp o s i t i v e . 3 Finally, a ‘libertarian’ government
would always undertake privatization.
It is of interest to consider the circumstances under which these approaches would obtain
the political support of voters. For the paternalist case, suppose that voters know that market
ﬂuctuations are generated by noise traders with mistaken beliefs and do not know whether
their own beliefs are mistaken. If individuals acted on this knowledge as traders, common
priors and common knowledge of rationality would imply a no-trade equilibrium (Milgrom
and Stokey 1982). To derive a ‘self-paternalist’ outcome we assume instead, following Elster
(1979), that individuals know that, as traders, they will act on their beliefs. As voters they
are therefore willing to bind themselves in advance not to trade. Under the conditions of the
model presented above, all self-paternalist voters will prefer the pre-privatization outcome
to the post-privatization outcome.4
A libertarian policy may be justiﬁed on grounds of process alone, without reference to
welfare outcomes (Nozick 1974). Alternatively, given a methodological commitment to core
hypotheses of market eﬃciency and individual rationality, models such as that of De Long
et al. (1990) must be rejected in favor of models in which the market price of equity reﬂects
the true social cost of risk. If a model of the latter class is correct, government ownership
conceals risks that are, in reality, borne indirectly by taxpayers (Domberger 1995). If this
view is accepted, then all voters will prefer privatization.
An intermediate case arises if all voters believe their own estimates of risks and returns
are unbiased. In this case, privatization will generally be viewed as beneﬁcial by both sophis-
ticated traders and noise traders (assuming they ignore any losses incurred by governments),
but will, under the conditions noted above, reduce the net worth of government and the
welfare of period 0 consumers. In the absence of compensation, the political outcome will be
determined by the relative strength of gainers and losers. Suppose the eﬀects of reductions
in government net worth are borne primarily by net recipients of government expenditure
3 Note that losers such as period 0 consumers may be compensated in such a way that all groups experience
an improvement in subjective expected utility.
4 One might object that people with such meta-beliefs should simply refrain from trading in risky equities
and hold only debt. However, the equity premium puzzle is accompanied by a ‘risk-free rate puzzle’ in that the
rate of return to riskless debt is lower than appears reasonable, so that an individual decision to refrain from
trade in equities does not eliminate the loss generated by noisy trade. Because of the simplifying assumption
that the riskless asset is in perfectly elastic supply, the risk-free rate puzzle does not arise in the De Long et
al model.
10and by taxpayers who do not hold, or wish to hold, equity. We will refer to this group simply
as ‘government supporters’. Similarly, the eﬀects on period 0 consumers is a proxy for the
eﬀects on those who hold substantial equity and expect to be net sellers. We will refer to
this group as ‘old money’ voters.
Then, in the absence of compensation, the political feasibility of privatization depends
on the formation of a coalition of sophisticated and noisy traders which can overcome the
resistance of government supporters and ‘old money’ voters. This seems to be an accurate de-
scription of the support base of the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom (Zahariadis
1995). Similarly, and perhaps more surprisingly, large-scale privatisations were undertaken
by labor governments in Australia and New Zealand. These governments attracted support
from rising entrepreneurs, the ﬁnancial sector and from upwardly mobile voters. Opposition
was divided between ‘old money’ voters, who continued to support traditionally conservative
parties and government supporters who had traditionally supported the labor parties.5 In
all the cases discussed above, the divided nature of the opposition allowed governments to
retain oﬃce for some years with the support of around 40 per cent of voters.
If lump-sum compensation is feasible and is always paid to losers, voters will prefer pri-
vatization as long as (14) is positive. The sign of (14) will depend on the magnitude of the
aggregate bias λx
r d∗, the riskiness of equity markets, and on the risk-aversion of the repre-
sentative voter/consumer. Thus we might expect the political popularity of privatization to
vary in line with social changes that aﬀect risk-aversion and with changes in estimates of the
riskiness of equities. It is interesting to observe that the rise of privatization in the 1980s
coincided with a rapid decline in the proportion of voters and politicians old enough to recall
the Great Depression.
The analysis above must be modiﬁed to take account of other factors that will aﬀect the
desirability of privatization. Where privatization is accompanied by an increase in operating
eﬃciency the beneﬁt from this increase should be taken into account. One possibility is to
a s s u m et h a tt h et r u er e t u r ni np e r i o d1i sg r e a t e rt h a nr. On the other hand, the ﬁscal and
social returns to privatization may be reduced if governments are unable to commit them-
selves regarding the possibility of renationalization or adverse regulation (Zeckhauser and
Horn 1989) or if the privatized ﬁrm is characterized by monopoly power and/or externalities
requiring close regulation (King & Pitchford 1999).
In the analysis presented above, governments are assumed to respond directly to the
ex ante preferences of voters. The model could be enhanced by consideration of strategic
behavior such as that considered by Perotti and Biais (2001). In their model, governments
seek to reduce support for redistribution by using privatisation to ensure that the median
voter holds shares and is therefore more likely to oppose policies of redistributing income
from capital to labor.
5 Traditionally conservative parties also changed their policies to support privatization. However, in both
Australia and New Zealand, the lead in implementing privatization was taken by labor governments.
114 Concluding comments
The well-known equity premium puzzle is closely related to the less familiar, but equally sur-
prising, observation that the proceeds from privatization are frequently lower than plausible
estimates of the present value of future earnings, discounted at the real bond rate. In this
paper, it has been shown that if the equity premium arises from the mistaken beliefs of noise
traders, privatization may reduce public sector net worth. Moreover, evaluated in terms of
the correct beliefs of sophisticated investors, there is a reduction in social welfare associated
with privatization that must be balanced against any improvements in operating eﬃciency.
More generally, if the equity premium arises because of capital market imperfections,
the market rate of return on risky assets is, in general, greater than the socially optimal
risk-adjusted discount rate and privatization may reduce welfare. However, continued public
ownership may be dominated by a ﬁrst-best policy that addresses the relevant market failure
directly.
Appendix
Derivation of change in certainty equivalent consumption of sophisticated consumer who will
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and from (5) we have































































De Long, J. Bradford, Shleifer, Andrei, Summers, Lawrence, and Waldmann, Robert
J. “Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets.” J.P.E. 98 (Aug. 1990): 703-738.
Domberger, Simon. “What Does Privatization Achieve? - A comment on Quiggin.”
Aust. Econ. Rev.( J u n e ,1 9 9 5 ) :4 3 — 7 .
Elster, Jon. Ulysses and the Sirens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
Hirshleifer, Jack, and Riley, John. The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information, Cam-
bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Kikeri, S.; Nellis, J.; Shirley, M., Privatization: The Lessons of Experience, Washing-
ton, DC, The World Bank (1992).
King, Stephen P. and Pitchford, Rohan. “A Taxonomy of Optimal Ownership and Man-
agement Regimes.” The University of Melbourne, Department of Economics, Research
Paper No. 625 (1999).
Kocherlakota, Narayana R., “The Equity Premium: It’s Still a Puzzle,” J. Econ. Lit.
34 (March 1996): 42—71.
Mankiw, N. Gregory. “The Equity Premium and the Concentration of Aggregate
Shocks.” J. Financial Econ. 17 (Sept. 1986): 211—19.
Mehra, Ranjesh and Prescott, Edward C. “The Equity Premium: a Puzzle”, J. Mone-
tary Econ. 15 (March 1985): 145—61.
Milgrom, Paul and Stokey, Nancy. “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge.” J.
Econ. Theory 26 (1982): 17—27.
Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1974.
Orosel, G.O., “Informational Eﬃciency and Welfare in the Stock Market.” European
Econ. Rev. 40(7) (Aug. 1996): 1379—1411.
Palley, T.,“Speculation and Tobin taxes: Why Sand in the Wheels can Increase Eco-
nomic Eﬃciency.” Zeitschrift Fur Nationalokonomie, 69 (2) (1999): 113—126.
Perotti, Enrico C. and Biais, Bruno, “Machiavellian Privatization,” Amer. Econ. Rev.
(forthcoming).
Quiggin, John, “Does Privatization Pay?”, Aust. Econ. Rev. 95 (June 1995), 23—42.
13Reitz, Thomas A., ‘The Equity Premium: A Solution.” J. Monetary Econ. 22 (1998):
117—31.
Shiller, Robert J., Market Volatility, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989.
Vickers, John, and Yarrow, George. Privatization: An economic analysis, Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.
Zahariadis, N.,‘Markets, States and Public policy: Privatization in Britain and
France’,Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
Zeckhauser, Richard and Horn, M. “The Control and Performance of State-owned En-
terprises”, in Macavoy, P., Stanbury, W., Yarrow, George and Zeckhauser, Richard.
(ed.), Privatization and State-Owned Enterprises, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publish-
ers, 1989.
14